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Inappropriate disclosure and use of personal health
information could have severe adverse consequences for
the individual to whom it pertains, but non-disclosure
could adversely affect other individuals or the society. In
Australia efforts are under way to develop legislation that
will address the protection of confidential health
information. Development of large-scale health
information repositories, intended to facilitate access to
health information to many more parties than was
previously possible, makes the Issue of consent
enforcement and access control more urgent than ever.
Literature suggests that the majority of security threats
arise out of insider activities. It is proposed to develop a
confidentiality protection framework that will ensure
personal, identifiable health information is only disclosed
by consent or under circumstances prescribed by law, and
that all access to that information is audited. The
framework, based on encryption of health information at
the time of collection, and decryption at the time of
authorised use, provides a number of advantages over the
traditional, enterprise-centric protection model.
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1. Introduction
Although not without controversy [I. 2], privacy is
considered an important civil right [3, 4] and personal
information warrants protection through legislation [5]..
As personal health information is considered the most
sensitive kind of personal information [6], its protection
is very important. particularly in the context of the
emerging Electronic Health Records systems (EHRs).
EHRs have the potential for privacy and
confidentiality breaches of a previously unseen severity.
To gain the benefits of EHRs while minimising the risks
requires both legislative and technological safeguards.
Current protection measures are inadequate. Existing
systems employ standards and technologies that are
based on the traditional, enterprise-centric security model
that is not sufficient to address the issues posed by the
EHRs. These issues are of immediate relevance to
Australia-specific initiatives already under way, such as
the HealthConnecf [7] and the Health e-link [8]
initiatives, both of which have been criticized for relying
on legislation without providing adequate technical
measures [9-12].
This paper outlines the issues arising out of the
implementation of EHRs and perceived threats to
confidentiality of health information. It further proposes
a confidentiality protection framework that would
mitigate those threats and discusses its strengths and
weaknesses.
2. Ethical and Legal Context
The notion of protecting confidentiality of health
information is reputed to go back to 460 B.C. with the
Hippocratic Oath containing an explicit passage to that
effect [13].
It is expected that personal health information, shared
III confidence with health workers, will remain
confidential [14, 15].
Inappropriate disclosure of confidential health
information can lead to long-term adverse psychological,
social or financial consequences for the affected
individuals. These range from embarrassment, through
discrimination, threat of violence or death, to
unwillingness to undergo medical treatment for fear of
disclosure [16].
Disclosure of personal health information about one
individual may affect other individuals. For example
advances in genetic typing and research into hereditary
diseases, coupled with inappropriate use of genetic
information, may affect not just the individual to whom
the information pertains but also their relatives. At the
same time, lack of critical information, for example about
allergies or communicable diseases, at critical times, may
lead to adverse consequences for the individual or the
society.
Much legislative work was undertaken in recent
years, both in Australia [6,17-21] and abroad [21, 22], to
establish legal frameworks for protection of personal
health information. Both voluntary regulation [12] and
the legislation currently in force in Australia are
fragmented, differ from state to state and are considered
inadequate [2 I, 23] The draft National Health Privacy
Code [17] is not yet a law. Its proposed provisions are
already controversial [19] with some interest groups,
most notably the Australian Medical Association [24],
considering it too restrictive in some areas whilst not
restrictive enough in others.
3. Related Work
There is evidence of a number of efforts to standardise
electronic health records [25-27], ensure secure
transmission of health records [28, 29], implement
electronic health record repositories [21] and implement
linkages between records from different sources [12].
The essential relationship between the electronic
health information, privacy and legal protection
frameworks is exemplified by the United States' Health
Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA) and its explicit
health information privacy protection provisions [22, 30].
In Australia, under the umbrella of the federal
government's HealthCol1l1ect initiative, a number of
electronic health records trials are underway in
Queensland, Tasmania and New South Wales[8, 16, 31]
Electronic Health Records systems are considered by their
proponents as essential to improving healthcare [21, 3 I,
32],
4. Privacy and Confidentiality Threats
Whilst storage and access to records held by the
Australian EHRs are subject to consent, and research into
implementing consent systems has been undertaken in
conjunction with these initiatives [14], issues such as, for
example, transfer of ownership of records between parties
are raising concerns [33]
Privacy risks posed by the proposed national EHRs
are seen as severe [10] and the purported benefits, it is
suggested, are lesser to patients than to other parties [16,
23,34].
Literature suggests [35-37] that the majority of
security threats arise out of insider activities. Numerous
individuals, other than the information subjects and health
workers, can access patient information. potentially
bypassing audit and access control provisions of the
systems that hold and purport to control access to those
records.[9]
Significant advantages that can be derived by
numerous panics, including governments and private
sector organisations, from access to personal, identifiable
health information, make those parties seek to gain
access, not always by lawful means.
5. Issues
Personal health information about identifiable
individuals is considerably different from other
confidential information and must be treated differently.
Although owner-controlled information schemes were
proposed and discussed [32, 38], most information about
individuals is collected and stored in information systems
not under the control of the information subject.
With some notable exceptions [39], confidentiality
provisions of information systems [37, 40-42], including
the HealthCol111ect[7] and the Health e-link[8], are based
on the traditional, enterprise-centric model of ownership
and control [9, 43] where a single enterprise is the
collector, the owner and the custodian of a collection of
information. This model largely pre-determines data
quality, system security and access control thinking,
design and implementation.
Some of the implied assumptions, for example that
information is collected within the organisation directly
from individuals for internal organisational use, are
challenged by the new electronic health record systems,
that both call for routine transfer of patient information
between General Practitioners, Hospitals and other
healthcare settings, and for implementation of large-scale
repositories, storing personal health information collected
elsewhere. Confidentiality protection challenges of those
systems suggest that a totally new approach must be
developed. Security measures must be an integral part of
information systems and must address known and
expected security threats and exposures [9, II, 15, 37]
Personal health information is typically collected as part
of an encounter between the patient and the healthcare
professional, by consent, and in confidence. With large
volumes of data now held electronically it is however
reasonably easy to mass duplicate records without
detection if security and audit mechanisms are bypassed.
In addition to people involved in collecting and
recording information and those who use it in the course
of interaction with the subject, a great many other
individuals may have access to confidential information,
with, or without, explicit authorisation.
Even though the custodian enterprise may implement
standards-compliant security policies [43], ensure that
information is transmitted over secure channels[7, 8, 44],
and do all that current best practices dictate, there still are
individuals, who have no relationship to the information
subject. who have access to information about them.
Mass record storage systems, mandated by the
HealthCol111ect and similar initiatives, intended to
facilitate access by many parties who have not previously
had access, further weakens the protection, assumed to
exist when individuals agree to disclose their personal
health information in confidence.
Whilst a number of standards and standards-based
technologies have been applied to various areas of the
problem domain[40-42, 44], and research has been
conducted into confidentiality infrastructure [14, 45],
there is no evidence of an effort to develop a
comprehensive confidentiality protection framework.
6. Proposed Confidentiality Framework
6.1 Requirements
The following requirements should be recognized:
• apart from the need for health workers to access
information about an identifiable individual during
the course of interaction with those individuals, there
is no need for that information to be viewable in a
human-readable fOlID.
• technology measures must back up the legislative
provisions [14, 24].
• methods exist whereby information about identifiable
individuals can be presented in a way such that it is
still useable for research and statistical purposes but
that it cannot be directly used to identify the
individual
• aggregated and de-identified information can be
made available for research and statistical
purposes[15, 39, 45-47].
It is suggested that
• access to confidential health information should only
be granted to those who have a patient-carer
relationship with the subject and in relation to that
relationship, or those who must have access under the
law.
• under no circumstances should confidential health
information be able to be viewed without consent or
authorisation, and without secure audit trail.
• only a system that implements active measures to
make it impossible to view protected information will
satisfy the requirements and assist in enforcing health
information privacy legislation.
6.2 Confidentiality Framework
It is proposed that a framework, based on encryption
of stored records, combined with access audit
mechanisms, would prevent accidental or deliberate
disclosure and would facilitate prosecution of violators.
To be practical. the framework must be built upon proven,
effective technologies and must not impose excessive
overheads.
Encrypting information at the point of capture and
decrypting it at the point of use will satisfy the primary
purpose of personal health information without exposing
it to inappropriate disclosure.
The framework relies on a number of underlying
concepts and infrastructure components described below.
Health In/ormation Classification Hierarchv allows
labelling of different parts of the record according to the
sensitivity of the information they contain, clinical
discipline, classes of health care workers that typically
require access or the need to allow the subject to
explicitly grant or deny access. Certain parts of the
record would be labelled as 'mental health', 'sexual
health', 'administrative' information or 'grant access to
hospital care team'. Certain classifications would imply
other classifications, for example mental health
information would be a specialisation of general clinical
information, allowing, for example, access granted to a
specialised classification to also grant access to its
superclass.
Accessor Classification Hierarchy places each
potential accessor into one or more groups that can be
granted or denied access to specific parts of the record
according to the information classification hierarchy
labels.
Consent Hierarchy allows the information subject to
allow or deny access to specific parts of the record
according to information sensitivity, clinical discipline,
event type, for example hospitalisation, or any
combination of the Health Information Classification
Hierarchy labels.
Each record would be represented as a XML Instance
Document [49], structured according to the Health
Information Classification Hierarchy.
Specific parts of the record would be encrypted using
techniques of the XML Encryption Specification[ 48] such
that parts of the most confidential nature would be
encrypted individually, possibly with different keys
according to the classification labels, less critical parts
would be encrypted independently, possibly causing
superencryption of some parts, and finally the entire
record, with some parts not yet encrypted, would be
encrypted in its entirety. This process would take place at
the point ofrecord creation and would result in creation of
an encrypted record, creation of a record entry in the
global record index and the creation of a default consent
entry in the global consent store.
Each record would be identified by a globally unique
ID to facilitate, in conjunction with the hierarchy labels,
location of appropriate encryption keys.
Encryption keys, accessor enrolment details, subject
consent grants and access requests audit trail would be
held independently of the encrypted records, and would
be administered by one or more organisations established
for the purpose.
Access to information contained in encrypted records
would involve location and retrieval of the records,
request for access, verification of requestor identity,
verification of access grant, creation of an audit trail,
retrieval of decryption keys and finally decryption of the
appropriate parts of the record for viewing.
The supporting technology infrastructure would, at
minimum, include a global, possibly federated, record
index, participant register, consent store, encryption key
store and audit trail store, each of which could, if desired,
be independent, possibly administered by a different
organisation. This infrastructure would be deployed at the
national level, or at minimum, at the level of a state, a
region or a province.
As it is encrypted, the health record could be stored
anywhere, and replicated, and transferred, with no
concern for confidentiality.
The use of current common cryptographic algorithms,
standards and technologies would satisfy the conditions of
proven technology and minimal impact.
6.3 Advantages
The framework would address all the major issues
associated with the electronic health record systems.
Encryption will eliminate the possibility of casual
disclosure and undetected data alteration. All access
would be audited, and consent strictly enforced. Large
volume data storage management, including replication,
distribution and facility management outsourcing. could
be implemented with a view to attaining the greatest
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Subsets of records
could be distributed on compact disk, or similar media, to
reduce demand for network bandwidth and expedite
access.
6.4 Disadvantages
Encryption of health records would introduce issues
not previously encountered. Most notably, complexity of
applications used to view patient information would be
increased. The application would need to contain the
necessary mechanism to decrypt the data and validate its
integrity.
It would be impossible to update old records - new
records would need to be created with additional or
changed information.
Separate infrastructure for research would have to be
established and data would have to be specially prepared
for inclusion III research stores. perhaps usmg
pseudonymity and anonymity techniques and methods
described in [39. 45, 46] and elsewhere
7 Conclusions
The legal framework for protection of confidential
health information must be backed up by technological
solutions that would implement appropriate protection
measures.
Implementation of electronic health records systems,
facilitating access to personal. identifiable health
information to many more parties than previously
possible, makes the requirement for implementation of
adequate confidentiality protection. consent. access
control and audit mechanisms an urgent issue.
The confidentiality protection framework proposed in
this paper will ensure that confidential health information
can only be viewed by consent, with authorisation or in
circumstances prescribed by law, and that a complete
audit trail is maintained.
Encrypting patient records at the point where they
enter the electronic patient records systems, transmitting
and storing these records in an encrypted form, and
performing decryption only at the time and at the point of
authorised use, will eliminate the possibility of casual
disclosure.
Separating large volume data storage from storage and
management of authorisation, consent and encryption
keys will facilitate storage design that optimises cost and
efficiency.
Of themselves, none of the concepts that form the
framework are entirely new. The systematic assembly of
those concepts into a comprehensive health information
confidentiality framework is, we believe, what makes an
important contribution to the field.
There are numerous technology applications, concepts
and standards, both existing and yet to be developed,
implied in the framework. An enormous amount of
research is, and that is yet to be, undertaken in many areas
to make the health information confidentiality framework
practical. We trust that the research will continue to turn
this vision into reality.
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Inappropriate disclosure and use of personal health
information could have severe adverse consequences for
the individual to whom it pertains, but non-disclosure
could adversely affect other individuals or the society. In
Australia efforts are under way to develop legislation that
will address the protection of confidential health
information. Development of large-scale health
information repositories, intended to facilitate access to
health information to many more parties than was
previously possible, makes the issue of consent
enforcement and access control more urgent than ever.
Literature suggests that the majority of security threats
arise out of insider activities. It is proposed to develop a
confidentiality protection framework that will ensure
personal, identifiable health information is only disclosed
by consent or under circumstances prescribed by law, and
that all access to that information is audited. The
framework, based on encryption of health information at
the time of collection, and decryption at the time of
authorised use, provides a number of advantages over the
traditional, enterprise-centric protection model.
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1. Introduction
Although not without controversy [I, 2], privacy is
considered an important civil right [3, 4] and personal
information warrants protection through legislation [5] ..
As personal health information is considered the most
sensitive kind of personal information [6], its protection
is very important, particularly in the context of the
emerging Electronic Health Records systems (EHRs).
EHRs have the potential for privacy and
confidentiality breaches of a previously unseen severity.
To gain the benefits of EHRs while minimising the risks
requires both legislative and technological safeguards.
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Current protection measures are inadequate. Existing
systems employ standards and technologies that are
based on the traditional, enterprise-centric security model
that is not sufficient to address the issues posed by the
EHRs. These issues are of immediate relevance to
Australia-specific initiatives already under way, such as
the HealthConnect [7] and the Health e-link [8]
initiatives, both of which have been criticized for relying
on legislation without providing adequate technical
measures [9-12].
This paper outlines the issues arising out of the
implementation of EHRs and perceived threats to
confidentiality of health information. It further proposes
a confidentiality protection framework that would
mitigate those threats and discusses its strengths and
weaknesses.
2. Ethical and Legal Context
The notion of protecting confidentiality of health
information is reputed to go back to 460 B.C. with the
Hippocratic Oath containing an explicit passage to that
effect [13].
It is expected that personal health information, shared
in confidence with health workers, will remain
confidential [14, 15].
Inappropriate disclosure of confidential health
information can lead to long-term adverse psychological,
social or financial consequences for the affected
individuals. These range from embarrassment, through
discrimination, threat of violence or death, to
unwillingness to undergo medical treatment for fear of
disclosure [16].
Disclosure of personal health information about one
individual may affect other individuals. For example
advances in genetic typing and research into hereditary
diseases, coupled with inappropriate use of genetic
information, may affect not just the individual to whom
the information pertains but also their relatives. At the
same time, lack of critical information, for example about
allergies or communicable diseases, at critical times, may
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lead to adverse consequences for the individual or the
society,
Much legislative work was undertaken in recent
years, both in Australia [6,17-21] and abroad [21, 22], to
establish legal frameworks for protection of personal
health information, Both voluntary regulation [12] and
the legislation currently in force in Australia are
fragmented, differ from state to state and are considered
inadequate [21, 23). The draft National Health Privacy
Code [17] is not yet a law. Its proposed provisions are
already controversial [19] with some interest groups,
most notably the Australian Medical Association [24],
considering it too restrictive in some areas whilst not
restrictive enough in others.
3. Related Work
There is evidence of a number of efforts to standardise
electronic health records [25-27], ensure secure
transmission of health records [28, 29], implement
electronic health record repositories [21] and implement
linkages between records from different sources [12].
The essential relationship between the electronic
health information, privacy and legal protection
frameworks is exemplified by the United States' Health
Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA) and its explicit
health information privacy protection provisions [22, 30].
In Australia, under the umbrella of the federal
government's HealthConnect initiative, a number of
electronic health records trials are underway in
Queensland, Tasmania and New South Wales[8, 16,31).
Electronic Health Records systems are considered by their
proponents as essential to improving health care [21, 31,
32],
4. Privacy and Confidentiality Threats
Whilst storage and access to records held by the
Australian EHRs are subject to consent, and research into
implementing consent systems has been undertaken in
conjunction with these initiatives [14], issues such as, for
example, transfer of ownership of records between parties
are raising concerns [33].
Privacy risks posed by the proposed national EHRs
are seen as severe [10] and the purported benefits, it is
suggested, are lesser to patients than to other parties [16,
23,34].
Literature suggests [35-37] that the majority of
security threats arise out of insider activities. Numerous
individuals, other than the information subjects and health
workers, can access patient information, potentially
bypassing audit and access control provisions of the
systems that hold and purport to control access to those
records. [9].
Significant advantages that can be derived by
numerous parties, including governments and private
sector organisations, from access to personal, identifiable
health information, make those parties seek to gain
access. not always by lawful means.
5. Issues
Personal health information about identifiable
individuals is considerably different from other
confidential information and must be treated differently.
Although owner-controlled information schemes were
proposed and discussed [32, 38], most information about
individuals is collected and stored in information systems
not under the control of the information subject.
With some notable exceptions [39], confidentiality
provisions of information systems [37, 40-42], including
the HealthConnect[7] and the Health e-link[8], are based
on the traditional, enterprise-centric model of ownership
and control [9, 43] where a single enterprise is the
collector, the owner and the custodian of a collection of
information. This model largely pre-determines data
quality, system security and access control thinking,
design and implementation.
Some of the implied assumptions, for example that
information is collected within the organisation directly
from individuals for internal organisational use, are
challenged by the new electronic health record systems,
that both call for routine transfer of patient information
between General Practitioners, Hospitals and other
healthcare settings, and for implementation of large-scale
repositories, storing personal health information collected
elsewhere. Confidentiality protection challenges of those
systems suggest that a totally new approach must be
developed. Security measures must be an integral part of
information systems and must address known and
expected security threats and exposures [9, II, 15,37]
Personal health information is typically collected as part
of an encounter between the patient and the health care
professional, by consent, and in confidence. With large
volumes of data now held electronically it is however
reasonably easy to mass duplicate records without
detection if security and audit mechanisms are bypassed.
In addition to people involved in collecting and
recording information and those who use it in the course
of interaction with the subject, a great many other
individuals may have access to confidential information,
with, or without, explicit authorisation.
Even though the custodian enterprise may implement
standards-compliant security policies [43], ensure that
information is transmitted over secure channels[7, 8, 44],
and do all that current best practices dictate, there still are
individuals, who have no relationship to the information
subject, who have access to information about them.
Mass record storage systems, mandated by the
HealthConnect and similar initiatives, intended to
facilitate access by many parties who have not previously
had access, further weakens the protection, assumed to
exist when individuals agree to disclose their personal
health information in confidence.
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Whilst a number of standards and standards-based
technologies have been applied to various areas of the
problem domain[ 40-42. 44). and research has been
conducted into confidentiality infrastructure [14, 45),
there is no evidence of an effort to develop a
comprehensive confidentiality protection framework.
6. Proposed Confidentiality Framework
6.1 Requirements
The following requirements should be recognized:
• apart from the need for health workers to access
information about an identifiable individual during
the course of interaction with those individuals, there
is no need for that information to be viewable in a
human-readable form.
• technology measures must back up the legislative
provisions [14, 24).
• methods exist whereby information about identifiable
individuals can be presented in a way such that it is
still useable for research and statistical purposes but
that it cannot be directly used to identify the
individual
• aggregated and de-identified information can be
made available for research and statistical
purposes[15, 39, 45-47).
It is suggested that
• access to confidential health information should only
be granted to those who have a patient-carer
relationship with the subject and in relation to that
relationship, or those who must have access under the
law.
• under no circumstances should confidential health
information be able to be viewed without consent or
authorisation, and without secure audit trail.
• only a system that implements active measures to
make it impossible to view protected information will
satisfy the requirements and assist in enforcing health
information privacy legislation.
6.2 Confidentiality Framework
It is proposed that a framework, based on encryption
of stored records, combined with access audit
mechanisms, would prevent accidental or deliberate
disclosure and would facilitate prosecution of violators.
To be practical, the framework must be built upon proven,
effective technologies and must not impose excessive
overheads.
Encrypting information at the point of capture and
decrypting it at the point of use will satisfy the primary
purpose of personal health information without exposing
it to inappropriate disclosure.
The framework relies on a number of underlying
concepts and infrastructure components described below.
Health In/ormation Classification Hierarchy allows
labelling of different parts of the record according to the
sensitivity of the information they contain, clinical
discipline, classes of health care workers that typically
require access or the need to allow the subject to
explicitly grant or deny access. Certain parts of the
record would be labelled as 'mental health', 'sexual
health', 'administrative' information or 'grant access to
hospital care team' _ Certain classifications would imply
other classifications, for example mental health
information would be a specialisation of general clinical
information, allowing, for example, access granted to a
specialised classification to also grant access to its
superclass.
Accessor Classification Hierarchy places each
potential accessor into one or more groups that can be
granted or denied access to specific parts of the record
according to the information classification hierarchy
labels.
Consent Hierarchy allows the information subject to
allow or deny access to specific parts of the record
according to information sensitivity, clinical discipline,
event type, for example hospitalisation, or any
combination of the Health Infonnation Classification
Hierarchy labels.
Each record would be represented as a XML Instance
Document [49), structured according to the Health
Information Classification Hierarchy.
Specific parts of the record would be encrypted using
techniques of the XML Encryption Specification[ 48) such
that parts of the most confidential nature would be
encrypted individually, possibly with different keys
according to the classification labels, less critical parts
would be encrypted independently, possibly causing
superencryption of some parts, and finally the entire
record, with some parts not yet encrypted, would be
encrypted in its entirety. This process would take place at
the point of record creation and would result in creation of
an encrypted record, creation of a record entry in the
global record index and the creation of a default consent
entry in the global consent store.
Each record would be identified by a globally unique
ID to facilitate, in conjunction with the hierarchy labels,
location of appropriate encryption keys.
Encryption keys, accessor enrolment details, subject
consent grants and access requests audit trail would be
held independently of the encrypted records, and would
be administered by one or more organisations established
for the purpose.
Access to information contained in encrypted records
would involve location and retrieval of the records,
request for access, verification of requestor identity,
verification of access grant, creation of an audit trail,
retrieval of decryption keys and finally decryption of the
appropriate parts of the record for viewing.
The supporting technology infrastructure would, at
minimum, include a global, possibly federated, record
index, participant register, consent store, encryption key
store and audit trail store, each of which could, if desired,
be independent, possibly administered by a different
organisation. This infrastructure would be deployed at the
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national level, or at minimum, at the level of a state, a
region or a province.
As it is encrypted, the health record could be stored
anywhere, and replicated, and transferred, with no
concern for confidentiality.
The use of current common cryptographic algorithms,
standards and technologies would satisfy the conditions of
proven technology and minimal impact.
6.3 Advantages
The framework would address all the major issues
associated with the electronic health record systems.
Encryption will eliminate the possibility of casual
disclosure and undetected data alteration. All access
would be audited, and consent strictly enforced. Large
volume data storage management, including replication,
distribution and facility management outsourcing, could
be implemented with a view to attaining the greatest
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Subsets of records
could be distributed on compact disk, or similar media, to
reduce demand for network bandwidth and expedite
access.
6.4 Disadvantages
Encryption of health records would introduce issues
not previously encountered. Most notably, complexity of
applications used to view patient information would be
increased. The application would need to contain the
necessary mechanism to decrypt the data and validate its
integrity.
It would be impossible to update old records - new
records would need to be created with additional or
changed information.
Separate infrastructure for research would have to be
established and data would have to be specially prepared
for inclusion 111 research stores, perhaps using
pseudonymity and anonymity techniques and methods
described in [39, 45, 46] and elsewhere
7 Conclusions
The legal framework for protection of confidential
health information must be backed up by technological
solutions that would implement appropriate protection
measures.
Implementation of electronic health records systems,
facilitating access to personal, identifiable health
information to many more parties than previously
possible, makes the requirement for implementation of
adequate confidentiality protection, consent, access
control and audit mechanisms an urgent issue.
The confidentiality protection framework proposed in
this paper will ensure that confidential health information
can only be viewed by consent, with authorisation or in
circumstances prescribed by law, and that a complete
audit trail is maintained.
Encrypting patient records at the point where they
enter the electronic patient records systems, transmitting
and storing these records in an encrypted 1'01111, and
performing decryption only at the time and at the point of
authorised use, will eliminate the possibility of casual
disclosure.
Separating large volume data storage from storage and
management of authorisation, consent and encryption
keys will facilitate storage design that optimises cost and
efficiency.
Of themselves, none of the concepts that form the
framework are entirely new. The systematic assembly of
those concepts into a comprehensive health information
confidentiality framework is, we believe, what makes an
important contribution to the field.
There are numerous technology applications, concepts
and standards, both existing and yet to be developed,
implied in the framework. An enormous amount of
research is, and that is yet to be, undertaken in many areas
to make the health information confidentiality framework
practical. We trust that the research will continue to turn
this vision into reality.
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